How to Improve Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa? by Bikoue, Siméon Maxime
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.24, 2020 
 
27 
How to Improve Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
Siméon Maxime Bikoue 
Advanced School of Economics and Commerce, University of Douala, P.O. Box 1931, Douala, Cameroon 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to try to explain governance failures in Sub-Saharan Africa and to identify reforms which 
can lead to good governance. The failures are mainly due to institutions that do not work properly, corruption, and 
lack of real democracy. Governance reforms can be both institutional and political. The political reforms should 
promote and reinforce democratic practices. Institutions should guarantee the rule of law and limit the elite’s 
economic and political power. 
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1. Introduction                                         
Although it is difficult to specify, the concept of governance is used according to two approaches. The first one 
which is considered as technical and static refers primarily to the administration of State structures and institutions 
(World Bank, 1989, 1994,2000). The second approach involves actors other than the State. Governance is seen as 
the conduct of the State and society towards the achievement of societal objectives (Adejumobi 2002; Pierre and 
Guy, 2000; Hyden, 1999). An attempt to synthesize these two approaches can be found in Kaufmann et al. (2000), 
Kaufmann (2003) where governance refers to the traditions and institutions through which authority is exercised 
in a country. This would include: the process by which rulers are chosen, made accountable, controlled and 
replaced; the ability of governments to manage resources effectively and to formulate and enforce sound policies 
and regulations; respect for the institutions governing the economic and social interactions between citizens and 
the State. 
There are three main actors in the governance arena: the State, the civil society, and the private sector. The 
notion of governance is underpinned by a philosophical conception of a social pact between the State and society 
through which they interactively define national objectives and negotiate the process to achieve them by working 
collectively, although there may be some tensions and contradictions in the achievement of these objectives 
(Adejumobi, 2006). The problem, according to Adejumobi (2006) is that of how the national capacity is improved 
in a free and democratic environment in the best interest of society.  
All over the world, countries are working to develop their economies and thereby improve the living standards 
of their populations. This task is particularly hard in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which has experienced economic 
decline, growing unemployment, deterioration of basic infrastructure, worsening social inequalities and growing 
poverty in recent decades. Indeed, 44% of the population of SSA, i.e. approximately 300 million people, lived on 
less than one US dollar per day in 2002 (UNSG, 2006 Report); the national income per capita is 746 USD in SSA 
as compared to 37 600 USD in the United Kingdom for example (WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
(WDI), 2007); life expectancy at birth is 47 years in SSA compared to 79 years in the United Kingdom (WDI, 
2007); one fifth of children (20%) die before the age of five compared to 0.6% in the UK (World Bank, 2005); 
56% of the population has access to drinking water compared to 100% in the UK (WDI, 2007). 
This situation is mainly due to what is often called bad or rather failing governance: no real rule of law, 
inadequate protection of property rights, rampant corruption and biased decision-making serving vested interests.  
Starting from the commonly accepted assumption that there is a strong correlation between good governance 
and development objectives (Kaufmann et al 2000, Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007), the purpose of the paper is 
on the one hand, to explain the failure of governance in SSA, and on the other hand, to explore ways to improve 
this governance. The rest of the paper is organized according to the following sequence. First, we shall try to 
identify and examine the determinants of governance failure in SSA (II). Next, we shall discuss the governance 
reforms necessary to achieve the development objectives in SSA (III) and then we shall point out some limitations 
of these reforms as well as the factors blocking them (IV). Finally, we shall conclude (V). 
 
2- Determinants of governance failure in Sub-Saharan Africa   
Good governance consists in allocating and managing resources to respond to collective problems; it is 
characterized by the principles of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, efficiency, equity and 
strategic vision. 
In the field, these principles can be experienced through tangible facts such as free and fair elections at regular 
intervals, a MPs who actually propose, enact laws and exercise control; and an independent judiciary that interprets 
laws. These principles are also reflected in the respect of human rights, the rule of law as well as the guarantee of 
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transparent and accountable institutions. "Good" or "democratic" governance also exists where government 
authorities rely on the will of the people and are accountable to them. It exists where transparent and democratic 
institutions allow full participation in political affairs and where the protection of human rights guarantees free 
expression, association and contestation. Finally, it exists where the government and its institutions defend the 
poor and the weakest and promote the human development of all citizens. The present and past realities of SSA 
show that apart from a few rare exceptions (for example Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa), these 
principles are far from being respected. Indeed, in this part of the world described by the World Bank (2000, 2003) 
as the poorest among the poor, we can note the following here and there: non-respect for property rights and basic 
democratic rules, systemic corruption, arbitrary practices, the wasting and plundering of scarce national financial 
resources for private interests ... 
Three essential factors seem to explain the failure of governance in SSA: dysfunctional institutions, 
corruption, and the absence of a real democracy. 
 
2.1 Dysfunctional institutions   
The term institution is defined in different ways. North (1990) makes it a very broad concept designating the formal 
and informal rules that govern human interactions. Narrow definitions focus on specific organizations, procedures 
or regulations. At an intermediate level, institutions are defined with reference to the protection of property rights, 
the fair application of laws and regulations, and corruption. This meaning is narrower than that of NORTH (1990) 
which includes as mentioned above all the standards governing human interactions. In general, relatively recent 
research on the determinants of development uses this intermediate definition (Acemoglu (2003); Acemoglu et al 
(2001), Rodrik and Subramanian (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian et al (2002), Easterly. And Evine (2002), Edison 
(2003).) 
Good institutions have three characteristics (Acemoglu 2003): by guaranteeing the respect of property rights 
to a large part of the population, they encourage in a wide range of individuals to invest and participate in economic 
life; by limiting the action of elites, politicians and other powerful groups, they prevent them from appropriating 
the income or investments of others or from distorting the rules of the game; and by promoting equal opportunities 
for large sections of society, they encourage investment, especially in human capital, and participation in economic 
production. Past and present experience shows in many countries, especially in SSA that these conditions are far 
from being respected, in particular a patrimonial and neo-patrimonial management of the State (the very 
embodiment of institutions), and a "weak" State prevails there. 
2.1.1  Patrimonial State   
Traditional power in Africa is fundamentally patriarchal in nature; it is based on kinship and is exercised by the 
elder over his immediate group, the lineage. The patrimonial State corresponds to an extension of this power 
beyond the family sphere (Weber, 1971). Political patrimonial power is different from other forms of traditional 
power. It is a power organized around a chief, who exercises his power through the family channel, but also through 
that of the loyal ones, the servants and the customers who constitute to a certain extent his "administrative general 
staff". This system is based on the accepted obligation and loyalty of members to chiefs, and not on the quality of 
the public service they render. The leader's duty is to generously reward those who follow and serve him and to 
severely punish those who do not show themselves to be sufficiently "cooperative". This "personal government" 
is characterized by a set of relationships that leaders maintain not with their citizens, but with parents, clients, 
supporters and rivals and who together form the patrimonial system (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). The State is 
therefore managed as a "father" does: there is thus a confusion between personal affairs on the one hand and 
political, administrative and judicial affairs on the other hand. There is no separation between the private and the 
public domain. 
With colonization, and then independence, we kind of went from patrimonial management to neo-patrimonial 
management of the State affairs. 
2.1.2 Neo-patrimonial State 
In this type of state there is a particular connection between modern bureaucratic norms and patrimonial norms 
with as a result the existence of specific institutions such as "single political parties", centralized administrations, 
and the masses often consolidated by an ethnic base (Jacquemot and Raffinot 1993). Ethnicity is pervasive 
throughout Africa in the political system. Thus, Van Den Berghe (1971) notes that: “In the struggle for posts in 
the administration, the army, schools and universities, State institutions, private bureaucracies, the surest weapon 
is ethnic claim, the assurance of political support on an ethnic basis”. National allegiance is replaced by regional, 
tribal, clan or family ties. This situation creates in some countries (Cameroon, Niger, Togo, Nigeria, Rwanda…) 
an opposition between ethnic groups oriented towards trade and industry, kept away from power and placed under 
surveillance, and those who hold and occupy all the administration and the army; plainly, those who exercise 
political power. 
This situation largely accounts for the development of emergency economic legislation. The State is no longer 
seen as the common good of all citizens, but as a "sesame", a "cash cow" that different groups can use for the 
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social advancement and enrichment of some people. The political struggle is nothing but the struggle for “food”, 
like Bayart (1989) so well described it. The State appears in fact as the main provider of wealth and the logic is 
circular (Medard, 1991): “To seek power is also to seek wealth, and to seek wealth is to seek power, since one 
leads to the other and vice-versa".  
2.1.3 « Weak » State 
The notion of “weak” state, borrowed from Myrdal (1969) characterizes a situation of “functional anarchy” 
(Jacquemot and Raffinot, 1993): lack of respect for the directives issued by the authority (this is often the case in 
Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria, DRC, Laurent Gbagbo’s Côte d'Ivoire, Taylor’s Liberia), collusions between this 
Authority and pressure groups whose acts should be controlled by the Authority, and the general tendency to evade 
all forms of administrative control. Corruption is central to this system. 
 
2 .2 Corruption  
Although it is quite difficult to define corruption precisely, just like governance itself, there is a consensus that it 
refers to acts where the power of a public office is used for personal gain by contravening the rules of the game 
(JAIN 2001). Certain illegal acts such as fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, black markets do not in 
themselves constitute corruption because they do not resort to the use of public power to satisfy a personal 
economic interest. 
Defined in this way we can identify in SSA three types of corruptions: the noble, the bureaucratic and the 
legislative ones. 
Noble corruption ("grand corruption") refers to the acts in which the political elite exploits its positions of 
power to shape economic policies. Public spending is directed towards the sectors where the gains from corruption 
are highest, little or no attention is paid to the real needs of the community (Porta and Vannucci, 1997). Although 
bribes are paid here and there, this type of corruption is difficult to identify when the debate on public policy is in 
the name of the public interest. “Grand” corruption can have worse consequences on society. The extreme situation 
of this form of corruption arises when a dictator is at the head of a country and makes no distinction between his 
personal wealth and that of the country or makes political decisions only to serve his own interests. All things 
considered, we can say that the regimes of Bokassa (CAR), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), IDI 
Amin Dada (Uganda), Mobutu (former Zaire) probably corresponded to this extreme situation of noble corruption.  
Bureaucratic corruption or "petty corruption" refers to acts of corruption between appointed bureaucrats and 
their hierarchy (the political elite) or with the public. In its most common form, public users have to bribe 
bureaucrats either to obtain a service or to speed up administrative procedures (Rose-Ackerman, 1998). Thus, the 
police, justice, health, education, customs, taxes are sectors often pointed out by the NGO TRANSPARENCY in 
a certain number of SSA countries (Nigeria, Chad, CAR, Angola…). 
Legislative corruption refers to the way and extent to which the voting behaviour of legislators can be 
influenced. They may receive bribes from the lobbies of business people (usually Western expatriates) or other 
pressure groups to enact laws favourable to their activities and to block laws harmful to these same activities. This 
is particularly observed in mining and / or oil-producing countries (DRC, Congo, Sudan, Angola, Chad, Sudan, 
Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Equatorial Guinea). 
Whether noble, bureaucratic or legislative, corruption requires the co-existence of three elements (Bliss and 
Di Tella, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Jain 2001): a discretionary power, an economic rent associated with this 
power, a lax judicial system 
2.2.1 Agents’ discretionary powers  
Above anything else, corruption requires that an individual should have discretion (the authority to set and 
administer rules) over the allocation of resources. The discretionary powers of the three types of agents - the 
political elite, administrators, and legislators - differ in terms of the sources of these powers and in terms of their 
ability to control their "subjects". The elite is chosen by the people to make a defined economic and social policy. 
This elite acquires extensive powers by the implementation of this policy and it is very difficult to know whether 
it is made of good politics or not. Besides simple situations leading to nepotism, fraud, tribalism or regionalism it 
is also difficult to observe corruption on its part. The administrators are appointed by the political elites and 
delegate their power to them to administer the policies which they have previously defined. The precision of the 
rules and the cost of monitoring these administrators will determine their leeway in terms of corruption. Just as 
they choose the political elite, the people also choose lawmakers and observe their voting behaviour. Their 
discretion lies in the fact that they are drafting legislation that will apply to the other two agents (the political elite 
and the administrators). The degree of corruption of legislators is solely controlled by the people who have the 
capacity not to re-elect corrupt legislators.  
The three agents thus have incentives to satisfy their own interests at the expense of their principals (behaviour 
which is fairly illustrative of the principal agent model). The greater the discretion, the stronger the incentives for 
agents to succumb to the temptation of corruption ceteris paribus (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). Note, however, that 
not all uses of power by politicians, legislators, or bureaucrats constitute corruption (Grossman and Helpman, 
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1994). The term "discretion", like corruption itself, is difficult to measure (Johnson, Kaufman, Shleifer 1997). In 
general, discretionary powers are associated with regulations (Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
2.2.2  Economic rent 
The economic rents associated with discretionary powers constitute the second determinants of corruption. The 
higher the annuities, the greater the incentives for annuitants to try to evade regulations and the higher the bribes 
they can offer to agents with discretionary power (Braguinsky, 1996). By definition, this could exclude 
discretionary powers that do not affect the income of identifiable groups. For example, the power of bureaucrats 
to change regulations that apply to certain aspects of civic behaviour should not lead to corruption. Lack of 
democracy and poor bureaucracy enable rent seeking to continue (Khan, 2003). Why? First, the absence of 
democracy increases the likelihood for a small group to continue seeking socially damaging rent (OLSON (2000), 
(1997), North (1990)). Second, low wages for the bureaucracy, a back-up political bureaucracy, and a poor 
judiciary can each reduce the anticipated cost of accepting the bribe by the corrupt agents, making rent-seeking 
more likely (World Bank (1997) 
 Empirical tests relating to the magnitude of rent excesses are difficult to perform in SSA because it is difficult 
to estimate the size of such rents. Some authors have nevertheless estimated proxy values of rents in the case of 
United States (Goel and Nelson, 1998; Jain and Tirtroglu, 2000). 
2.2.3 Lax judiciary  
The third determinant of corruption concerns the functioning of the justice system. Corruption occurs when the 
justice system offers a sufficiently low probability of detection and / or penalty for the offender, or worse, when 
the judiciary is itself corrupt. 
 
2.3 Lack of real democracy 
Modern democracy (understood as the establishment of a State endowed with institutional mechanisms making it 
possible to avoid the arbitrariness of power and mediating confrontations) according to Jacquemot and Raffinot 
(1993) is an attempt to overcome neo-patrimonialism as it can only be based on an ever-greater degree of 
institutionalization of power. 
Since the 1990s, social movements have been active in the field of democracy all over the African continent, 
particularly in SSA. These movements stand out compared to previous movements in reference to the ideology of 
human rights and by a challenge to the method of sharing both national wealth and international aid. The expression 
of the protest is first of all urban and, when it is voiced by civil servants, private sector employees and students, 
its main target is the structural adjustment measures imposed by the IMF and the World Bank which "undermine" 
their economic and social basis. The protest also quite often concerns the organization of the electoral process and 
the proclamation of presidential, legislative and municipal elections results (Wade’s Senegal, Conté’s Guinea 
Conakry, Obasanjo’s Nigeria, Deby’s Chad, Eyadema’s Togo, Guei’s Côte d’Ivoire, Kabila’s DRC…). These 
movements testify to a new maturity of the urban classes which benefit from a higher education and a wider access 
to information than forty years ago. Moreover, they are based on relatively solid intermediate social groups, and 
therefore on what deserves to be called “public opinion”.  
Nothing however guarantees a priori the totally progressive character of these movements, sometimes quickly 
labelled as democratic. When the most demanding categories are made up of civil servants and students, the 
complaints are about maintaining the privileges of the welfare State, namely scholarships, the guarantee of outlets, 
the maintenance of jobs… – so many ingredients typical of an inefficient and expensive civil service – and do not 
concern the improvement of the living standards of the peasant or the urban underclass. Despite his active 
participation in demonstrations, the urban underclass remains incapable of formulating a credible demand 
(Jacquemot and Raffinot 1993). 
Democracy intends to redistribute differently, but it cannot develop without resources to distribute. The 
democratic claim in SSA is based on an ambiguity: it protests against the shortage of political and financial 
resources, but it may not be able to put an end to it in the short term. The difficulty it encounters is that the stake 
of the competition is not only political, but economic and political, since access to State functions always directly 
conditions access to wealth. Under such conditions, democratization will only be able to take root and avoid a 
return to dictatorships if there is effective social control of the circulation of wealth, if it is a means of limiting 
prebends by forcing the holders of power "to eat less quickly and less alone”. 
       
3. Governance reforms in ASS  
The classic perception of the State as a "service provider" shows that the role of the State is to ensure law and 
order, stable property rights, basic public goods, and redistribution to favour well-being. Faced with the inability 
to provide these elements, State failures imply poorer performance in terms of growth and poverty. This type of 
State failure has to be associated with a constellation of interrelated governance failures, including corruption and 
rent-seeking, market distortions and the absence of democracy. From this point of view, governance reforms in 
SSA can be both political and institutional. 
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3.1 Political Reforms  
Political reforms are understood as a movement towards true democracy and sometimes decentralization, together 
with encouraging the participation of civil society with a view to limiting the freedom to create arbitrary rents. 
Democratic governance seems to be the best context for ensuring citizens’ participation in decision-making 
because this participation is necessary in the choice of political leaders and increasing their accountability. This 
provides local governance and civil society with mechanisms through which citizens can voice their concerns, 
make decisions at the local level, and inform elected representatives on urgent matters. By providing local 
government with structures that allow the distribution of resources in a fair, transparent and accountable manner, 
democratic governance increases citizens' access to services. When decentralization is democratic, it creates a 
central authority. This makes governance more efficient and more responsive to local needs. The design and 
implementation of decentralized programmes improve access to basic services such as health care, education and 
low-cost housing. 
 
3.2  Institutional reforms   
Institutional reforms include moves to reshape the State to the right size by focusing on the services delivered, 
reducing the institutional capacity of the State to generate rents, increasing administration salaries by improving 
recruitment and by increasing the independence of the judiciary. 
Fighting against corruption is consistent with all of these reforms and it ensures that incentives to create rents 
are reduced. The argument is that correcting the failure of the State requires evolving at all of these levels 
simultaneously. These are the conditions necessary to specifically improve the State’s ability to provide public 
goods and stabilize property rights (World Bank (1997), Asian Development Bank (2000)). Corruption in SSA, as 
anywhere else in developing countries often results from the diversion of resources from the needy and discourages 
national and international investments (UNDP (2000)). This has a negative impact on economic growth, income 
levels and employment. Democratic governance must provide an institutional framework for press freedom, an 
active role for civil society and a system of checks and balances between executive, legislative and judicial powers 
- all of which are crucial in the fight against corruption, and in strengthening transparency and accountability in 
governance. 
      
4. Limits and obstacles to governance reforms in ASS 
The limits of the reforms can arise from the facts observed and interpreted. The obstacles to the effectiveness of 
these reforms are socio-cultural, political, legal, institutional and geopolitical factors.  
 
4 .1  Observation and  interpretation of facts  
A triple argumentation can be carried out. 
First, econometric studies conducted in SSA as elsewhere have found that governance variables such as corruption, 
the stability of property rights or even democracy are correlated with development objectives such as per capita 
income, per capita income growth, the investment rate and direct measures of poverty such as the child mortality 
rate (see for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Johson, Kaufman and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Clague, Keefer et al. (1997), World Bank (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997, 1995), Barro 
(1996), Mauro (1995)). However, Khan (2003) wonders whether the rush to establish that all good things go 
together has not influenced the measurement and interpretation of facts? Most of the studies conducted on these 
studies present their results with caution, which ultimately suggests that extra care should be taken when 
interpreting the results. It should be noted that not all econometric work adheres to the thesis of the link between 
governance and development. In particular, Treisman (2000) shows that the effects of democracy and 
decentralization on corruption are very weak. Burkhart and Beck (1994) show that it is the increase in per capita 
income that precedes the emergence of democracy and not the other way around. 
Next, Khan (2003) argues that indicators for measuring the quality of governance are subjective by their 
nature in such a way that corruption, democracy, stability of property rights and even the degree of 'distortion' 
induced by politics are measures of indicators based on perception, judgment, of "competent" observers. By 
constructing a composite governance indicator, previous expectations can introduce a bias in the choice of 
evidence and weights. In addition, the general lack of time series data makes it difficult to carry out causality tests 
between governance variables and development objectives. 
Finally, while admitting that corruption has a cost, Khan (2002 b) really raises the question of the level from 
which sustained reductions in corruption or from which improvements in democracy can be attained before 
economic prosperity in the broad sense is achieved, and more importantly, whether these governance reforms are 
likely to accelerate economic growth enough to have an impact on poverty. 
 
4.2 Society and Culture 
Some anthropological and sociological theses commonly mentioned maintain (though without scientific 
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foundations) that the behaviours and attitudes of individuals in sub-Saharan African societies are characterized by 
the following traits: magico-religious or prelogical or even pre-Newtonian mentalities, old value systems, fatalism , 
tribalism or regionalism, blind obedience to the leader, conservatism, immobility and pusillanimity. These 
characteristics are opposed, according to the proponents of these theses, to the principles of democratic governance 
and therefore to the economic development of Africa. The values and behaviour of individuals would be 
incompatible with the introduction of democratic principles, of rational and transparent management of resources. 
Their behaviour would therefore be anti-democratic and anti-economic. 
 
4.3 Law and Politics 
The absence of a rational legal order and security in trade, and the non-respect of contracts are likely to set back 
governance. For example, robbery in the south of Madagascar has led to a fall in agricultural production. The 
guerrillas and rebellions in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire have 
pushed these countries decades back. 
 
4.4 Institutions and Geopolitics 
A country torn into rival ethnicities (Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, DRC, Côte d'Ivoire), an insufficiently strong and 
respected State, lack of efficient, honest and competent public service will be bottlenecks in the democratic 
governance and development policies. Geopolitical factors can also influence the management of public affairs in 
SSA. Therefore, is it possible to carry out reforms of this management without addressing the geopolitical aims of 
South Africa and Angola, not to mention the ambitions of the Nigerian pole and the fears they provoke on the 
neighbouring countries, or on the future of the countries of East Africa, not to mention the conflict between the 
USA and Sudan which suddenly increases the geopolitical interest of Angola? 
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to try to explain on the one hand the failings of governance in SSA and, on the other 
hand, to identify the reforms likely to remedy them. It appears that these failures are mainly due to dysfunctional 
institutions, corruption among governance actors, and the absence of a true democracy. The dysfunction of the 
institutions is the consequence of a patrimonial and neo-patrimonial management of the State. Corruption appears 
as the manifestation of the discretionary power of certain agents and takes three main forms: noble, bureaucratic 
and legislative. The electoral process in general still remains marred by many irregularities at least in its practical 
functioning, reflecting undemocratic behaviour. 
Possible governance reforms can be both political and institutional. Political reforms should promote and 
strengthen democratic practices. The institutions must guarantee the rule of law and respect for the property rights 
of agents, limit the political and economic power of the elites, promote equal opportunities for individuals, 
encourage access to education and the participation of a large segment of the population in economic production. 
The limits to these reforms lie in the observed and interpreted facts (causal relationships not established between 
governance variables and development objectives). The sources of blockages to reforms would arise from socio-
cultural factors (conservatism, magical and religious mentalities, cult of the leader, pusillanimity), political and 
legal (ethnic conflicts, weak state, non-respect of contracts, insecurity of trade), institutional (refusal of formal or 
non-formal) and geopolitical (hegemonic ambitions of certain States: Nigeria, South Africa).  
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